

Key principles to Guide International Efforts in Aviation Security

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- I. Recent topics of Aviation Security in Japan
- II. Outline of the Ministerial Statement on Aviation Security

Recent topics of Aviation Security in Japan

1. 100% hold baggage screening

- ICAO Mandatory Requirement from January 1, 2006.
- Japan implemented 100% hold baggage screening on domestic flights as well as international flights.
- Japan is introducing In-line Screening Systems.

2. Flight Deck Security

- Reinforced flight crew compartment door. (from November 1, 2003)
- Japan amended regulations to require all applicable airplanes to install a reinforced door.
- Encourage airlines to install Cabin Monitor Camera.

3. Sky Marshal Program

- ICAO/G8 developed guidance materials for the introduction of the Sky Marshal Program.
- Japan implemented the Sky Marshal Program in December 2004.



Sky Marshal

4. Protection of screened passengers, baggage and aircraft

- G8 developed a best practice document on the protection of screened passengers, baggage and aircraft.
- Japanese regulations require airport terminal building operators to segregate the flow of arriving and departing passengers of international flights.
- Japan introduced staff screening on January 10, 2006.

5. Measures against MANPADS

- ICAO issued guidelines on airport vulnerability assessment in 2004.
- All APEC economies agreed to undertake a MANPADS vulnerability assessment at at least one of their international airports by the end of 2006.
- Japan carried out a MANPADS vulnerability assessment at a major international airport in 2004.



DHL Cargo aircraft was hit in November 2003

6. Aviation Security Quality Control Program

- G8 developed a best practice guidance document on Quality Control.
- Japan conducts inspections and tests to verify whether airports are properly implementing security measures according to National Civil Aviation Security Quality Control Program.

7. Aviation Security Stakeholders

- G8 developed a best practice guidance document on Stakeholders.
- Japan's National Aviation Security Committee meets on a regular basis. The committee members consists of representatives from the Civil Aviation Bureau, National Police Agency, Coast Guard, Defense Agency, Air Carriers, Airport Authorities, Forwarders, etc.

8. ICAO Universal Security Audit Program (USAP)

- The ICAO USAP was established in 2001 and launched in November 2002.
- Japan received USAP audit team in September 2005.
- Japan is the second largest contributor to the ICAO USAP, providing \$720,000 in 2005. (accounting for 15% of the total fund)

Key Principles to Guide International Efforts - Ministerial Statement on Aviation Security -



Ministerial Conference on International Transport Security
(January 12 – 13, 2006 in Tokyo)

1. Implementing and enforcing ICAO rules and encouraging their application to domestic operations, where appropriate

Challenge

- Due to financial issues and other restrictions, some countries do not meet the ICAO International Security Standard.
- Terrorist attacks on domestic flights occur frequently.

Principle

- Urge States to implement and enforce the Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) of Annex 17 (*Security*) to the Chicago Convention and other ICAO provisions relating to aviation security.
- Strongly encourage the application of the above-mentioned SARPs and ICAO provisions to domestic operations, where appropriate.

Future actions

- Continue to support ICAO activities both financially and in terms of human resources.
- Promote the domestic application of the international standards worldwide, with the consideration that each country has a different threat level for domestic flights.

2. Improving screening capability by sharing technologies and promoting international cooperation in research and development

Challenge

- Suicide bombing
- Ways to hand-carry weapons, explosives and other dangerous goods by Terrorist become more deep-laid.
 - ✓ Plastic explosives concealed under clothes (Aircraft bombings in Russia in August 2004)
 - ✓ Handmade explosives



Shoe bombs

Principle

- Encourage State to adopt improved screening capability and practices
- Encourage State to share related expertise and technologies for screening
- Promoting international cooperation in research and development.

Future actions

- Best practice guidance document on screening be developed in G8.
- Sharing of knowledge and technology for improving screening.
- International cooperation in research and development.

3. Working bilaterally and multilaterally to achieve a high level of security in screening procedures

Challenge

- Balancing between security and facilitated transport is a main issue of G8 Secure and Facilitated International Travel Initiative (SAFTI) (Sea Island Summit 2004)
- The aviation security of the entire aviation network needs to be maintained by each related country.
- There is a gap of security level among relevant States.

Principle

- Encourage States to work bilaterally and multilaterally to achieve a high level of security in screening procedures for passengers and bags.

Future actions

- ICAO is making efforts in developing international guidelines on a validation process for One-stop security.
- Bilateral or multilateral arrangements for aviation security would be envisaged.

4. Facilitating passenger travel in a manner that does not compromise security by various methods including biometrics

Challenge

- Balancing between security and facilitated transport is a main issue of G8 Secure and Facilitated International Travel Initiative (SAFTI) (Sea Island Summit 2004)
- The utilization of biometrical technology will enhance aviation security by accurate identification of passengers, and promote travel facilitation.

Principle

- Encourage the facilitation of passenger travel in a manner that does not compromise security, by various methods including biometrics, while being mindful of data privacy protection issues.



Narita airport (2005.2-3)

Future actions

- International cooperation on sharing of knowledge and experience about the use of biometric information.
- Like-minded countries prepare a list of appropriate contact points in order to share information on new technologies and measures.

5. Developing best practices for air cargo security

Challenge

- Air cargo security is one of vulnerable sectors in security due to a great amount of various kinds of air cargo.
- Air cargo security measures vary among countries.
- Increasing international cargo transport.

Principle

- Encourage the development of internationally strengthened and harmonized measures and best practices for air cargo security, taking into account the need to protect the entire cargo supply chain.

Future actions

- ICAO is expected to establish a study group to develop best practices for internationally reinforced and harmonized measures on air cargo, in consideration of the necessity of the protection of entire air cargo supply chains.

6. Increasing capacity building efforts to ensure the integrity of aviation security worldwide

Challenge

- The worldwide aviation network has been highly developed.
- The existence of countries and regions whose security measures are not sufficiently developed due to lack of financial and human resources. (Terrorists target at weak areas)

Principle

- Encourage States to promote aviation security capacity building efforts, both on a bilateral basis and through the use of multilateral and regional arrangements.

Future actions

- ICAO and like-minded countries will promote capacity building efforts.
 - holding of seminars on aviation security,
 - inviting of security experts from developing countries for exchange of information etc.



Japan-ASEAN Aviation Security Meeting
(2004.10 in Tokyo)

7. Encouraging States to register with the ICAO Aviation Security Point of Contact Network

Challenge

- The necessity of a worldwide aviation security contact network in order to cope with increasing threats against commercial flights and security-related emergencies.
- A 24-hour contact point network created under the initiative of G8 is in the process of being expanded to include all the ICAO member countries (189 countries).

Principle

- Encourage States to register with the ICAO Aviation Security Point of Contact Network, so that States can communicate effectively during situations of heightened threat or security-related emergencies.

Future actions

- ICAO will establish the ICAO Aviation Security Point of Contact Network.
- All ICAO member countries can register their contact points in this network.

International Air Transport Network is expanding globally and International efforts in Aviation Security is vital for further development of aviation.

Strong commitment by APEC member States for Aviation Security will help worldwide aviation activities.

Thank you for your attention.



Australian Government

Department of Transport and Regional Services

Mitigating Aviation Threats, Risks and Vulnerabilities

APEC STAR IV – Ha Noi, February 2006

Tony Beard

Office of Transport Security

Department of Transport and Regional Services

Australian Government

Resolution of Suspicious Activity

APEC STAR II Chile, March 2004, the Working Group on Air Transportation Security discussed *Threats to Civil Aviation and Security Measures*.

It was agreed that:

*An effective approach to air transportation security calls for training of personnel, in order for them to be able to **monitor suspicious activities and report incidents**.*



Australian Government

Department of Transport and Regional Services

Nature of the Threat

- Trans-national terrorism is the primary security threat
- Some APEC countries interests are a target of terrorist activity
- Places of mass gathering are a potential target
- Terrorist groups have demonstrated intent and capability
- There is constant heightened level of threat
- Nature and level of threat means we **Must Expect the Unexpected**
- There is likely to be no prior warning of attack
- Criminal activity highlights vulnerabilities



The Threat to Aviation Security

- The aviation sector is a target for terrorists because it concentrates people:
 - in large numbers;
 - at high density;
 - in accessible places; and
 - at regular, predictable times
- Forms of attack against the aviation sector have included:
 - Aircraft hijack or theft;
 - Improvised explosive devices;
 - Assaults by commando-style teams;
 - The use of “stand-off” weapons (eg mortars and missiles) to attack aircraft or infrastructure



The Threat to Regional Aviation

- Primary threat is from unlawful activity:
 - Deranged or emotionally disturbed persons
 - Air rage
 - Drunkenness
 - Hoax activity
- Regional and general aviation may be attractive to terrorists if it is seen to be a “softer” target
 - Flight schools
 - Hiring or theft of light aircraft or crop dusters
- Identification and Resolution of Suspicious Activity is essential



Criminality and Aviation Security

- Terrorism is a crime – not all crime is terrorism
- Professional organised criminals utilise vulnerabilities in aviation security regimes
- Their actions highlight vulnerabilities that may facilitate a terrorism
- Criminals want to preserve the transport system for their own ends
- Terrorists want to destroy the transport system for their own ends



Vulnerabilities

- Vulnerabilities potentially amplify terrorist capabilities and therefore increases the chance of a risk eventuating
- Vulnerabilities must be prioritised to focus and ensure proportional targeting of risk mitigation strategies there by best utilising resources
- Vulnerabilities should be prioritised through an intelligence led assessment of likelihood and an understanding of the local security context.



Vulnerabilities in the Aviation Sector

- Aviation operations gather people together in large groups and at regular, predictable times
- Aviation operations have inherent vulnerabilities
- Terrorists have demonstrated the intent and capability to exploit vulnerabilities in aviation systems
- Failing to identify risk and vulnerabilities in aviation operations changes the risk context
- Good security is both:
 - Effective physical measures
 - Creation of an environment and culture hostile to terrorist activity



Australian Government

Department of Transport and Regional Services

Points to Consider

- Terrorists plan and prepare to exploit security vulnerabilities
- They are expert in concealing knowledge of their plans
- They give no warning of an attack
- They have a demonstrated capacity and intent to attack transport infrastructure
- They focus on mass casualties and traumatic effects
- Almost anything is possible – expect the unexpected
- Their planning is thorough – pre-attack trial runs have been discovered after the fact
- Intelligence agencies and police uncover some plans but will never be able to uncover all



Australian Government

Department of Transport and Regional Services

What To Do About It


- Security responses must be based on risk management that is informed by threat information and security vulnerabilities
- There is a need to address the security challenges in a nationally consistent manner to ensure that:
 - The nature of the terrorist threat is recognised
 - Effective counter measures are developed which are relevant and proportional to the known threat
 - We develop an awareness and an ability to harness the capacity of the public, staff and officials to counter terrorism
 - All resources are harnessed to create a security environment that is 'hostile' to terrorists and facilitates the identification and resolution of suspicious behaviour



Australian Government

Department of Transport and Regional Services

Terrorists conduct pre-operational surveillance



Review & Conclusion

- APEC Chile 2004 - It was agreed that: *An effective approach to air transportation security calls for training of personal, in order for them to be able to monitor suspicious activities and report incidents*
- What have we done about this agreement?
- Have we included the Business-Government partnership?





Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation



Advance Passenger Information

Strengthening Border Security Using Cooperation and Technology

Suzanne Ford
Acting Director
International Border Initiatives
Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs
Australia

Advance Passenger Information

- API involves a government receiving data about travellers in advance of their arrival into the country
- This can include information about passengers, crew and transit travellers
- API can be used for immigration, security and customs purposes



Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation



API Benefits

- Benefits of API include
 - Enhanced border security
 - Increased passenger facilitation
 - Administrative benefits for government
 - Development and maintenance of relationships with stakeholders, such as airlines



Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation



Implementing API

- Requires consideration and planning
 - Legislation and policy
 - Strong internal and external agency relationships
 - Reliable and secure border management system
 - Skilled staff and support processes



Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation



Australia's API


- Advance Passenger Processing
 - Passenger details are checked against DIMA systems prior to boarding
 - Expected Movement Records are created
 - Prompt processing for cleared passengers



Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation



Australia's API



Australia's API Support

- Airline Liaison Officers
 - Assist airline officers in screening Australia-bound travellers at last points of embarkation
 - 20 officers in 15 locations assist airline staff & immigration officials
- Entry Operation Centre (24 x 7)
 - Contact point for airlines and maritime industry



Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation



APEC API Feasibility Studies

- The study process involves
 - Study visit to eligible economies and analysis of information collected
 - Discussion of report with economy
 - Formal presentation of report
 - Confidentiality of report and recommendations



Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation



APEC API Feasibility Studies

- Study visits have occurred in Thailand, Indonesia, Chile, Korea, Chinese Taipei, the Philippines, China, Vietnam and Brunei
- Technical assistance has been provided to Hong Kong (China)
- Capacity for further studies



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API Around the World

- The following have implemented or stated an intention to implement API
 - Australia
 - New Zealand
 - the United States
 - Japan
 - Hong Kong (China)
 - Korea
 - Canada
 - Mexico
 - Thailand
 - Chinese Taipei
 - Malaysia (seaports only)
 - Fiji
 - Samoa
 - Kingdom of Bahrain
 - United Arab Emirates



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Summary

- For best results, economies wishing to implement API should
 - Undertake strong planning, including adhering to APEC API standards
 - Ensure stakeholder cooperation
 - Cooperate with other economies in the region



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Regional Movement Alert List (RMAL)

Total Assessment and Moving Towards a Multilateral Arrangement

Douglas Palmeri

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**THE FOURTH APEC STAR CONFERENCE
24 – 25 February 2006**



Agenda

- 1. Pilot Background**
- 2. Program Overview**
- 3. RMAL Process**
- 4. Status**
- 5. Statistics**
- 6. 2006 Projected Activities**
- 7. Community Expansion**
- 8. Service Expansion**



Pilot Background

- **During 2004 Australia and the United States investigated the feasibility of an RMAL capability**
- **In 2004 APEC Leaders tasked the Business Mobility Group to develop a pilot RMAL System using lost, stolen and otherwise invalid passport data**




Program Overview

- **Objective:**
Improve domestic and international security while facilitating the management of international travellers
- **Strategy:**
Establish real-time automated data accessing arrangements that allow for the verification of foreign passport status
- **Engineering philosophy:**
Open design to permit expansion of community and services without constraint or reengineering



RMAL Process



Status

- **The RMAL Pilot between Australia and US went live in September 2005**
- **November 2005 APEC Ministers approved the continuation of the pilot and encouraged the expansion of RMAL to other economies**
- **New Zealand began RMAL testing in January 2006**



Statistics

- **As of 1 February 2006**
 - **92 Australian passports reported lost or stolen were detected, and**
 - **80 US passports reported lost or stolen were detected**
- **24/7 emergency operation centres**
 - **Two incident categories:**
 - **legitimate bearer of document**
 - **impostor**



2006 Projected Activities

- **New Zealand to go live in March 2006**
- **Apply lessons learned from Bilateral & Multilateral Pilots**
- **Obtain APEC approval of Multilateral Legal Framework (MLF)**
- **Obtain APEC approval of Governance proposal**
- **Schedule & hold RMAL working group sessions**
- **Invite other APEC economies to join**



Community Expansion

- **Legal capability to share travel document status information**
- **Automation capability to support electronic access to travel document alert list**
- **Ability to establish and maintain a 24/7 emergency operations centre**



Service Expansion

- **Passport format validation**
- **Positive validation against full passport databases**
- **Access to biographical data (digitally stored passport photos, etc.)**
- **Person alerts (watch lists)**
- **Synergies with other multilateral initiatives**





Foreign Affairs
Canada

Affaires étrangères
Canada

Canada



AVIATION SECURITY: PROMOTING BEST PRACTICES INTERDEPARTMENTAL COOPERATION TO PROMOTE EFFECTIVE RISK ASSESSMENT


APEC STAR IV, Hanoi, Feb 2006

Presented by: Tolly Foerstner, Foreign Affairs Canada



Introduction:

- domestic coordination of a specific decision making process
- purpose of Canada's "interdepartmental working group on aviation and security"
- how the process works
- best practices highlighted and benefits to a coordinated approach



INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

- CANADA SUPPORTS INTERNATIONAL AVIATION SECURITY




- MEMBERSHIP in:
APEC, arf, UN, G8,
OAS, OSCE, ICAO, WA



DOMESTIC COORDINATION

- **TRANSPORT CANADA LEADS ON AVIATION SAFETY AND SECURITY**
- **INTERNATIONALLY WE RECOGNIZE MEMBER ECONOMIES MUST COORDINATE THEIR EFFORTS**
- **THE SAME IS TRUE FOR GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS**



DOMESTIC COORDINATION

IWGAS – Chaired by Transport Canada, is the Interdepartmental Working Group on Aviation and Security



**Members: Core Departments –
Transport Canada, Foreign Affairs &
International Trade, RCMP, CBSA,
CSIS, Public safety, PCO**

PURPOSE OF IWGAS

DECISION MAKING PROCESS THAT
SUPPORTS POLICY AND ADDRESSES
SPECIFIC CHALLENGES TO AVIATION
AND NATIONAL SECURITY



IWGAS - PROCESS

- MEETS MONTHLY
- AD HOC COMMUNICATIONS
- INFORMATION IS SENSITIVE
- MEMBERS HAVE APPROPRIATE SECURITY CLEARANCE
- SECURITY, SAFETY, ECONOMIC, POLITICAL, BILATERAL COUNTRY ISSUES ADDRESSED

IWGAS PROCESS CONT...

- TRANSPORT CANADA RECEIVES APPLICATION FOR FOAC
- IWGAS MEMBERS NOTIFIED AND INFO REQUESTED BACK
- RED LIGHT/ GREEN LIGHT
- INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS
- COORDINATED DECISION BY MEMBERS



IWGAS PROCESS CONT...



- DECISION OF MEMBERS COMMUNICATED TO SENIOR MANAGEMENT TEAM
- TRANSPORT CANADA INFORMS MINISTER OF TRANSPORT OF DECISION
- TRANSPORT MINISTER INFORMS CABINET OF DECISION

BEST PRACTICES SUPPORTED

- EFFECTIVE SHARING OF INFORMATION
- COORDINATION OF GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS
- ACCOUNTABILITY

BENEFITS

- **LOW FINANCIAL IMPACT**
- **DOMESTIC & INTERNATIONAL SAFETY & SECURITY**
- **LINKS EXPERTS WITHIN GOVERNMENT**
- **GOVERNMENT-WIDE VISION**



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Threats to China's Civil Aviation & Counter Measures

A Presentation to the Fourth APEC STAR Conference

By Zheng Haiyang

Director, Bureau of Aviation Security
General Administration of Civil Aviation of the People's Republic of China

After "9.11" in 2001 and "8.24" in Russia last year, international civil aviation security is faced with many unprecedented threats. The impact of these threats on the security of economies is huge, and they have changed the concept of security prevention tremendously. Governments worldwide have attached great importance to aviation security.

The situation and problems of aviation security in China.

With the change of international and domestic situation, we have to handle many emerging problems now such as MANPADs which will probably be a potential new threat to civil aircrafts; increasing uncertain factors affecting domestic civil aviation security, loopholes in management of explosive articles, increased interference by individuals, cases like spreading false terror information, staying in the cabin when flight is unscheduled, or rushing into restricted areas due to dissatisfaction with service, sneaking forbidden articles into the plane; using mobile phones and smoking in defiance of regulations.

Characteristics of hijacking and aircraft-bombing in China.

The motives of the hijacker have changed from flight from an economy to revenging society and insurance swindle.

Criminals are becoming more and more cunning and deceptive. Thanks to enhanced ground security check by CAAC, it's difficult to bring forbidden articles to airplanes. In their sabotaging attempts, criminals resort to every conceivable means to conceal dangerous articles to board the plane. A ploy they usually take is to mix dangerous articles with commodities in the package. For example, some criminals try to

avoid security check by using a common pull-tab can to contain dangerous liquid. Another means they usually take is to hide real weapons with ordinary articles of similar shapes. Criminals put a real gun next to a toy gun. Once the X-ray inspectors find out the problem, the toy-gun could distract the inspectors' attention. Criminals might hide dangerous articles in their bodies or luggage where security inspectors can hardly discover, such as hiding explosives in a headband and then covering it with a hat.

Weapons which criminals hold become more dangerous and destructive. In the past, criminals interfered aviation security with conventional weapons such as guns, knives, and now, they usually use bombs and gasoline.

Criminals tend to be more fierce and cruel. In the past, they achieved their goals by threatening the safety of passengers without killing or wounding passengers on board on most occasions. Nowadays, some criminals aim to destroy aircrafts and kill all the passengers and the crew after hijacking the plane.

Counter measures China took

The General Administration of Civil Aviation of the People's Republic of China (CAAC) always pays much attention to civil aviation security and upholds the principle of safety first, and continuously strengthens professional training and effectively undertakes ground prevention and air disposal.

To enhance coordination and provide better guidance, National Steering Committee on Handling Hijacking was founded in 2001, and *National Program of Handling Hijacking* was formulated. Many big airports have organized rehearsals according to the anti-hijacking program, and have improved their ability to deal with the unpredictable events.

In the early 80's, cabin security personnel were formed, and air marshals were established in 2002. Cabin security and air marshals are responsible for maintaining security in the cabin and hijacking reactions. In addition, CAAC has reinforced cabin doors of all the passenger crafts and equipped aircrafts with the newly reinforced cabin doors.

Supervision of and inspection on aviation screening agencies have been strengthened and security screening measures have been enhanced.

China sticks to the practice of screening all hand baggage and check-in baggage through x-ray machines, and all suspicious baggage must be subjected to manual search. CAAC has also standardized cargo security check. All air cargo must be subjected to x-ray machine screening unless they are stored 24 hours before loading. Air cargo security check must be conducted in restricted areas. CAAC has taken strict security check measures for liquid articles to stop the flammables and the explosives on board and issued *Bulletin for Managing Liquid Articles*.

Training of security personnel has been enhanced. A set of high standards for employment, training and assessment was instituted by CAAC. To become an air marshal an applicant must go through background check, physical examination, 3 to 4 months training and final assessments. For an air marshal, no less than 16 hours professional training a month and 40 training days every two years are compulsory. In light of different types of initial training and time training, CAAC has compiled teaching materials and a series of textbooks for aviation security.

The on-job training certificate system has been carried out for security screening staff since 1994. Security screening staff must all receive 160 hours or more training of, and pass examinations before obtaining certificates. CAAC has issued *Regulation for Aviation Security Screening*, and *Aviation Security Screening Manual* and many other laws and regulations, developed training software for security screening staff which includes the relevant laws and regulations, images of dangerous goods and detection means. All of these have helped establish a unified security screening standards across the country.

It takes time and tremendous efforts to ensure aviation security, and it needs joint efforts of all the colleagues here. We hope member economies will continue to strengthen cooperation in this field.

Thank you!